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Bayesian open games
Joe Bolt, Jules Hedges, and Philipp Zahn
This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as intro-
duced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games
are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an eco-
nomic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not ex-
pressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments,
stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the
game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once.
To achieve this we make signicant use of category theory, especially the ‘coend
optics’ of Riley.
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1 Introduction
In [GHWZ18] the rst compositional treatment of economic game theory was introduced.
Following the literature on categorical open systems [Fon16], open games are modelled as
morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category.
A distinctive and non-obvious feature of this approach is that the Nash equilibrium
condition [Nas50], one of the central concepts in classical game theory to analyze rational
behavior of agents (cf. [FT91, Chapter 1.2] and [OR94, Chapter 2]), is itself compositional.
While an important rst step, the treatment in [GHWZ18] has two severe limitations:
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1. Games are deterministic and as a consequence, there are no chance elements in the
games and players have to choose deterministically.
2. Players have complete information about all relevant data of the game such as pay-
os, number of players etc.
Many interesting strategic situations feature chance elements. Poker is one example -
already discussed in the ground-breaking work by [NM44]. In an economic context, the
environment also often is non-deterministic. Two competing companies face uncertain
demand, exchange rates, lawsuits etc.
More subtle but also important is that players may need and may want to random-
ize their actions. There are well known situations like Matching Pennies (see, for in-
stance, [FT91, p. 16]) where playing deterministically means being “beaten” all the time.
Conceptually, from a game theory perspective, this means that there are games where
equilibria do not exist when players are limited to deterministic strategies whereas they
do exist when players can choose stochastically.
Lastly, it is a crude approximation to assume that players have complete information.
Examples abound. A used-car dealer knows how good that car is he is trying to sell to
you. You may not know. Banks sitting on toxic assets know how little value they actually
have. The government trying to buy these assets in order to save the nancial system
may not know. An agent bidding in an auction may not know how many other bidders
he competes with. In most situations incomplete information is the norm and not the
exception.
The above limitations restrict the applicability of compositional game theory to eco-
nomic phenomena. And it restricts its usefulness for economists. After all, classical game
theory already deals with these complications.
In this paper we provide a generalization of open games which solves the two problems
above in one go. We adapt the core denition of compositional game theory such that the
environment can be stochastic and players can also choose in a non-deterministic fash-
ion. Doing so, we also introduce a way to deal with incomplete information. Essentially
we are lifting the same “trick”, which has been introduced in classical game theory to
deal with games of incomplete information by John Harsanyi [Har67,Har68a,Har68b], to
compositional game theory.
Harsanyi argued that instead of dealing with games of incomplete information directly,
which poses formidable conceptual problems, we can transform such games into games
of imperfect information by introducing the notion of (game) types. Players have access
to probability distributions characterizing these games as well as partial access to this
information. For instance, in an auction a player may know how much he values the good
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to be auctioned. However, he may not know how other agents value the good. Assuming
that players update information according to Bayes’ rule and adapting the equilibrium
notion of Nash, to what is called Bayesian Nash equilibrium, game theorists can work with
such interactions not dierent to how they deal with chance elements in Poker. Thus by
transforming the problem, Harsanyi essentially opened the path to using tools that were
more or less already introduced by [NM44].
We are applying the same strategy. By introducing stochastic environments and adapt-
ing the equilibrium notion from Nash to Bayesian Nash we show that our compositional
framework captures exactly Bayesian Games and thus allows to deal with stochastic en-
vironments as well as with situations of incomplete information. This distinguishes our
work also from [GKLNF19] which address the issue of deterministic players in isolation.
1.1 Technical introduction
Contrary at least to our own initial beliefs, addressing these issues requires some serious
adaptions of open games as dened in [GHWZ18].
The recent understanding of open games has been based on lenses, which consist of a
pair of functions X → Y and X×R→ S packaged into a single morphism (X,S)→ (Y,R) of
a category. Here, the function X → Y is the play function, which plays out a given strategy
by taking an initial state to a nal state of the open game. The function X×R→ S, known
as the coplay function or coutility function, is more subtle: It ‘backpropagates’ payos into
the past, given an initial state. This operation is ‘counterfactual’, and the composition of
lenses (which is not trivial to dene, nor is obvious to see it is associative) intertwines
ordinary forward and counterfactual (or ‘teleological’) information ow.
An open game can then be viewed as a family of lenses indexed by strategy proles,
together with another component describing which strategy proles are Nash equilibria in
a given context. A context for an open game consists of an initial state (X) and a function
from nal states to payos (Y → R). Contexts turn out to also be intimately connected to
lenses, and indeed this was the initial hint that viewing open games in turns of lenses is
a deep idea rather than a coincidence.
To someone trained in thinking about processes with side eects, it is entirely natural
to begin by inserting a (nite support) probability monad D, and take the components of
the lenses to be Kleisli morphisms X → D(Y ) and X × R → D(S), or equivalently to uses
lenses over the category of sets and (nite support) stochastic functions. This allows
the strategies of an open game to describe probabilistic behaviours, which are known as
behavioural strategies in game theory. Unfortunately it doesn’t work: In order to prove that
lenses form a category (i.e. are associative and unital) it is necessary that the forwards
maps X → Y are homomorphisms of copying, and in the category of stochastic processes
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this characterises those processes that are actually deterministic.
Fortunately this problem has already been solved in the theory of lenses, although the
solution is far from obvious. We use the existential lenses or coend lenses developed as
developed by Riley [Ril18]. This means we replace the pair or functions X → D(Y ) and
X×R→ D(S) with three things: A choice of set A, a function X → D(A×Y ) and a function
A × R → D(S). Moreover a certain equivalence relation needs to be imposed, and this
is precisely given by the following coend [Lor15] (one of the universal constructions of
category theory): ∫ A
(X → D(A× Y ))× (A×R→ D(S))
The proofs in this paper make heavy use of a diagrammatic language for existential lenses
developed in [Ril18].
The second question is what should be considered a context of a Bayesian open game,
i.e. a replacement for the pair X × (Y → R). There is an existing characterisation of these
contexts in terms of deterministic lenses, namely as a ‘state’ lens (1, 1) → (X,S) and a
‘costate’ lens (Y,R)→ (1, 1). However this turns out to be a red herring: in section 3.4 we
show that generalising from this causes the category of open games to fail to be monoidal
in an unexpected way.
It turns out that the appropriate notion of context consists of three things: a set Θ
of unobservable states, a joint distribution on Θ × X (i.e. an element of D(Θ × X)) and a
function Θ × Y → D(R). Again we need to impose a certain equivalence relation, which
again turns out to be precisely a coend. Remarkably this is equivalent to a state in the
category of double lenses, i.e. lenses over the category of lenses. This brings an unexpected
theoretical unity to Bayesian open games, andmeans that the graphical language of [Ril18]
can be used throughout.
1.2 Acknowledgements
The text of this paper is closely based on the rst author’s forthcoming PhD thesis, [Bol19].
The authors gratefully thank Mitchell Riley, whose suggestion to apply coend lenses to
open games was crucial and very timely.
2 Concrete open games
We begin with a self-contained introduction to deterministic open games. The exposition
slightly deviates from previous work. We believe this eases the way for the generalisations
to come.
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2.1 Lenses
The history of mathematical lenses is complicated, involving many independent discov-
eries and fresh starts across numerous areas of mathematics and computer science. An
in-depth description of this history can be found at [Hed18]. We use lenses to describe
the ow of information through a game. A lens for a given game describes which players
have access to what information when making a strategic decision, and also how in-
formation about players’ strategic decisions is ultimately fed into out outcome function
for the game. For example, it may specify an order of play, or whether two players are
playing in parallel, or even whether some players are privy to certain information in the
environment that other players are not.
In general, lenses can be thought of as processes that perform some computation and
then propagate some resulting feedback from the environment backwards through a sys-
tem of which they are a part. In particular, this means that lenses have both covariant and
contravariant components. The covariant component carries out the initial computation
and the contravariant component propagates the resulting feedback back through the sys-
tem. Crucially, lenses are also compositional in the sense that they admit both sequential
and parallel composition and, consequently, form a symmetric monoidal category.
The lenses used in this paper are direct descendants of the lenses of database theory.
Given a database x of type X we may want to view some subdatabase y of type Y . This
is encapsulated by a view function v : X → Y . From this ‘close-up’ view of the database
we may want to edit the database by updating y. Given an update of the view y we then
need to know how this update propagates to an update of the original superdatabase x.
That is, given an original database x and an updated view y′ : Y , we should specify some
updated x′ : X given by some update function u : X × Y → X. The pair (v, u) is a lens with
type X → Y . The connection to our previous abstract denition of lenses is as follows:
• The covariant computation associated with the lens is the view function v : X → Y ,
• the resulting feedback from the environment is the update made to the subdatabase
returned by the view function, and
• this feedback is propagated back to the whole database via the update function.
Abstracting away from databases, there is no reason to demand that the feedback gener-
ated by the environment will have the same type as the output of the lens computation.
Similarly, we may be interested in cases where the update function is not-so-literally
an ‘update’ function, but merely a function that propagates some kind of feedback back
through the system. As such, the lenses we will be using will have types of the form
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(X,S) → (Y,R) where the covariant component of the lens is of type X → Y and the con-
travariant component is of type X ×R→ S.
In game theory, we can regard players as ‘lenses that care about the feedback they
receive from the environment.’ In a game with sequential play, players make some play
(computation), receive some utility (feedback) from the outcome function, and then pass
some feedback to earlier players in the game (their outcome function given the moves
that the later players chose). Moreover, given that lenses admit of parallel composition
as well as sequential composition, we obtain a nuanced notion of information ow in a
game.
In the next subsections we describe a symmetric monoidal category of concrete lenses.
‘Concrete’ here refers to the fact that the view and update functions are functions in Set.
We then come to the core of this section, the denition of a concrete open game.
2.2 The category of concrete lenses
Definition 2.1 (Concrete lens). Let X,S, Y and R be sets. A concrete lens l : (X,S) → (Y,R) is a
pair of functions (lv : X → Y, lu : X ×R→ S).
As a trivial rst example, there is an obvious mapping that takes a morphism of Set×
Setop and returns a concrete lens.
Example 2.2. Let f : X → Y and g : R→ S. Define a concrete lens 〈f, g〉 : (X,S)→ (Y,R) by
〈f, g〉v = f
〈f, g〉u(x, r) = g(r)
Definition 2.3 (Sequential composition of concrete lenses). Let l : (X,S)→ (Y,R) and t : (Y,R)→
(Z,Q) be concrete lenses. The sequential composite t ◦ l : (X,S)→ (Z,Q) is given by ((t ◦ l)v : X →
Z, (t ◦ l)u : X ×Q→ S
)
where
(t ◦ l)v = tv ◦ lv
and (t ◦ l)u is given by
X ×Q X ×X ×Q X × Y ×Q X ×R S.
∆X × idX idX × lv × idQ idX × tu lu
As a string diagram (t ◦ l)u is given by
tu
lu
R
Slv
Y
X
Q
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Lemma 2.4 (Sequential composition of concrete lenses is associative). Suppose we have concrete
lenses
(X,S) (Y,R) (Z,Q) (W,T )l m n .
Then n ◦ (m ◦ l) = (n ◦m) ◦ l.
Theorem 2.5 (Concrete lenses form a category). There is a category CL with object class Set×Set
and concrete lenses as morphisms.
2.3 The monoidal structure of concrete lenses
Definition 2.6 (Tensor composition of concrete lenses). Let l1 : (X1, S1) → (Y1, R1) and l2 :
(X2, S2) → (Y2, R2) be concrete lenses. The tensor composition l1 ⊗ l2 : (X1 × X2, S1 × S2) →
(Y1 × Y2, R1 ×R2) is given by
(
(l1 ⊗ l2)v, (l1 ⊗ l2)u
)
where
(l1 ⊗ l2)v = l1v × l2v
and (l1 ⊗ l2)u is given by
X1 ×X2 ×R1 ×R2 X1 ×R1 ×X2 ×R2 S1 × S2
∼= l1u × l2u
In a diagram, (l1 ⊗ l2)u is
l1u
l2u
S1
S2
X1
X2
R1
R2
Lemma 2.7. ⊗ is a functor.
Theorem 2.8. There is a symmetric monoidal category CL where the objects are pairs of sets and
the morphisms are concrete lenses. Sequential composition and the monoidal tensor are as in the above
definitions.
The following observations about states and eects in CL will be useful in the remain-
der of this Section.
Lemma 2.9. CL
(
I, (X,S)
) ∼= X.
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Proof. This is easily seen as a state l ∈ CL((I, (X,S)) is given by a pair
(
s : {?} → X, e : {?} × S → {?}).
Lemma 2.10. CL
(
(Y,R), I
) ∼= (Y → R)
Proof. An effect l ∈ CL((Y,R), I) is given by a pair
(
v : Y → {?}, u : Y × {?} → R).
2.4 Concrete open games
Now we have the necessary prerequisites in place to introduce the notion of a concrete
open game. A concrete open game consists in a set of strategy proles; a family of conrete
lenses indexed by the set of strategy proles; and a best response function.
Definition 2.11 (Concrete open game). Let X,S, Y, and R be sets. A concrete open game G :
(X,S)→ (Y,R) is given by
1. A set of strategy profiles Σ;
2. A play function P : Σ→ CL((X,S), (Y,R)); and
3. A best response function B : X × (Y → R)→ Rel(Σ).
The type X is the type of observations made by the game; the type Y is the type of
actions that can be chosen; the type R is the type of outcomes; and the type S is the
type of co-outcomes. Of the four types associated with a concrete open game, the type S
is the most mysterious. Succinctly, its purpose is to relay information about outcomes
to games acting earlier. In a sequential composite H ◦ G of open games (we will dene
sequential composition of concrete open games shortly), the co-outcome type of H is also
the outcome type G. We think of H as receiving some outcome which is then acted upon
by the contravariant component of a concrete lens given by H’s play function before being
passed back to G as G’s outcome.
The best response function of an open game is an abstraction from the utility functions
of classical game theory. Recall that a Nash equilibrium for a normal form game is a
strategy prole in which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. We can instead
think of a relation on the set of strategy proles for a normal form game where strategy
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proles σ and τ are related if τ is the result of players unilaterally deviating from σ to
their most protable unilateral deviation. Nash equilibria are then the xed points of this
relation. In the denition of a concrete open game, we work directly with a best response
relation rather than preference relations.
The play function takes a strategy as argument and returns a concrete lens that de-
scribes an open play of the game G (‘open’ here means ‘lacking a particular observation and
outcome function’ and is explained in the next paragraph). To justify this interpretation,
recall that a concrete lens l : (X,S) → (Y,R) consists in v : X → Y and u : X × R → S. The
view function v describes how a game decides on an action given an observation (similar
to how strategies for sequential games work). The update function u describes precisely
how games relay information about outcomes to other games acting earlier.
As the name suggests, concrete open games are open to their environment. The ap-
propriate notion of a context for a concrete open game is given in the following denition.
A concrete open game together with a context can be thought of as a full description of a
game.
Definition 2.12. Let G : (X,S)→ (Y,R). A history for G is an element x of X, an outcome function
for G is a function k : Y → R, and a context for G is a pair (x, k) : X × (Y → R).
We are now in a position to justify the type of the best response function. The best
response functions takes a context as argument, and a context is precisely the information
required for resolving the ‘openness’ of a concrete open game. Given a context, the best
response function then returns the set of best deviations from a strategy prole σ.
We represent a concrete open game G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) using the following diagram.
G
Y
RS
X
This diagrammatic notation emphasizes the point that information ows both covari-
antly through G from observations to actions, and contravariantly through G from out-
comes to co-outcomes. These diagrams constitute a bona de diagrammatic calculus for
the category of concrete open games dened in the remainder, as detailed in [Hed17].
Notation 2.13. String diagrams in the category of open games will always be drawn with arrowheads
on wires, whilst string diagrams in the ambient category will always be drawn without arrowheads.
Atomic concrete open games are an important class of concrete open games, and are
the basic components out of which more complex games are constructed. Whilst concrete
open games can, in general, represent aggregates of agents responding to each other (in a
way that will be made precise in 2.7 and 2.8), atomic concrete open games describe games
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in which there is no strategic interaction. Examples are simple computations in which no
decisions are made whatsoever and single agents sensitive only to a given context.
Definition 2.14 (Atomic concrete open game). A concrete open game a : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is atomic
if
1. Σa ⊆ CL
(
(X,S), (Y,R)
)
;
2. For all l ∈ Σa, PG(l) = l; and
3. For all contexts c : X × (Y → R), Ba(c) is constant.
We sometimes refer to an atomic concrete open game simply as an atom.
Note that an atom a : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is fully determined by a subset Σa ⊆ CL((X,S), (Y,R))
and a preference function ε : X × (Y → R)→ P(Σa).
Given f : X → Y and g : R→ S, as in CL, the pair (f, g) ∈ Set× Setop can be represented
as a concrete open game. We refer to such games as computations as no strategic choice
is being made.
Example 2.15 (Computation). Let f : X → Y and g : R → S. The atom 〈f, g〉 : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is
given by
1. Σ = {〈f, g〉}; and
2. For all c : X × (Y → R), ε(c) = {〈f, g〉}.
Similar to CL, the following computations will turn out to be the underlying structural
maps for the symmetric monoidal category of concrete open games.
Definition 2.16 (Structural computations). Define identity, associator, swaps, and left/right unitor
computations to be the atomic concrete open games given by
id(X,S) = 〈idX , idS〉
αX⊗(Y⊗Z),A⊗(B⊗C) = 〈αX,Y,Z , α−1X,Y,Z〉
s(X,A),(Y,B) = 〈s(X,Y ), s−1(A,B)〉
ρ(X,Y ) = 〈ρX , ρ−1Y 〉
λ(X,Y ) = 〈λX , λ−1Y 〉
where the Set functions on the right-hand side of the equalities are the obvious Set isomorphisms.
Counit games are an interesting class of atoms that reverse the direction of information
ow in a concrete open game.
11
Definition 2.17 (Counit). Let f : X → S. Define an atomic concrete open game cf : (X,S) →
({?}, {?}) by
1. Σcf = {〈!, f〉}; and
2. For all c : X × ({?} → {?}), ε(c) = Σcf .
We are being slightly relaxed with notation here as the update function for cf has type
X × {?} → S while f has type X → S. We represent cf as follows.
f
X
S
2.5 Agents
So far we have only seen open games for which the set of strategies is a singleton, de-
scribing games with no strategic decisions. Our rst examples of a concrete open game
with non-trivial strategy set are agents. These can be used to represent the utility max-
imising agents of traditional game theory or, more generally, to represent players trying
to inuence the outcome of a game.
Definition 2.18 (Agent). An agent A : (X, {?}) → (Y,R) is an atom whose set of strategies is
Σ = CL
(
(X, {?}), (Y,R)).
Recall that a concrete lens l : CL((X, {?}), (Y,R)) is a pair (v : X → Y, u : X × R → {?})
and, hence, is uniquely determined by a function of type X → Y . Consequently, a strategy
for an agent species how an agent map chooses an action of type Y given an observation
of type X. Given a context c : X× (Y → R), BA(c) picks out the set of strategies A considers
acceptable in the context c. Agents are represented diagrammatically by
A
Y
R
X
We can specialise the denition above to model the utility maximising agents of tra-
ditional game theory.
Example 2.19 (Utility maximising agent). The utility maximising agent A : (X, {?}) → (Y,R) is
given by
ε(x, k) =
{
σ : X → Y ∣∣ σ(x) ∈ arg max(k)}.
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2.6 Best response with concrete lenses
Recall from 2.9 and 2.10 that CL(I, (X,S)) ∼= X and that CL(I, (Y,R)) ∼= Y → R. Using these
facts we can rephrase the type of best response for a concrete open game G : (X,S)→ (Y,R)
as
BG : CL
(
I, (X,S)
)×CL((Y,R), I)→ Rel(ΣG).
This formulation allows for a concise and natural denition of sequential composition
for concrete open games where it would otherwise seem ad hoc. To make matters clear,
we write x when talking about elements of X and x? when talking about concrete lenses
with type CL(I, (X,S)). Similarly, we write k : Y → R when talking about functions in Set
and we write k? when talking about eects in CL((Y,R), I).
2.7 Sequential composition of concrete open games
In this section we specify how to dene the sequential composite H ◦ G : (X,S) → (Z,Q) of
two conrete open games G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) and H : (Y,R)→ (Z,Q).
We imagine that this composition really is sequential in a straightforward way. G is
‘played out’ according to some strategy σ ∈ ΣG and then H is ‘played out’ according to
some τ ∈ ΣH. A choice of (σ, τ) ∈ ΣG × ΣH therefore determines an open play of G and H
played in sequence, and so we take ΣG × ΣH to be the strategy prole set of H ◦ G.
The play function of the sequential composite is dened straightforwardly using the
sequential composition of conrete lenses dened in 2.3.
Dening best response for a sequential composite is a bit more delicate and, for ex-
planatory purposes, we make use of the informal notion of a local context for a subgame.
Given a context c = (x : X, k : Z → Q) and a strategy (σ, τ) for H ◦ G, the best response
relation of H ◦ G is specied by calling the best response function of G with a modied
context corresponding to how c ‘appears’ to G when H plays according to τ and, similarly,
calling the best response function of H with a modied context corresponding to how c
‘appears’ to H when G plays according to σ. In practice we dene these ‘local contexts’
in the obvious way that type checks, but this is because the work has already been done
in carefully choosing the correct denitions.
Definition 2.20 (Sequential composition for concrete open games). Let G = (ΣG ,PG ,BG) : (X,S)→
(Y,R) and H = (ΣH,PH,BH) : (Y,R)→ (Z,Q) be concrete open games. Define
1. ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH,
2. PH◦G(σ, τ) = PH(τ) ◦ PG(σ) (where ◦ composition is in CL), and
3. BH◦G(x?, k?)(σ, τ) = BG(x?, k? ◦ PH(τ))σ × BH(PG(σ) ◦ x?, k?)(τ).
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We represent H ◦ G with the diagram
G
X
S
H
Y
R
Z
Q
.
2.8 Tensor composition for concrete open games
The tensor composition of open games represents simultaneous play. The denition of
tensor composition Given concrete open games G : (X1, S1) → (Y1, R1) and H : (X2, S2) →
(Y2, R2), the strategy set for G ⊗ H is ΣG × ΣH; we make use of the tensor composition in
CL in dening the play function; and the best response function is given by modifying
the context c to give local contexts for G and H.
Definition 2.21 (Local contexts for tensor composition). Define the left local tensor context operator
L :
(
X ′ × (X ′ → Y ′)× (Y × Y ′ → R×R′)
)
→ (Y → R)
by
L(x′, p′, k)(y) = pi1 ◦ k(y, p′(x′)).
As a diagram, L(x′, p′, l) is the function
x′
X′
p′
Y ′ k R′
Y
R
Similarly, define the right local tensor context operator
R :
(
X × (X → Y )× (Y × Y ′ → R×R′)
)
→ (Y ′ → R′)
by
R(x, p, k)(y′) = pi2 ◦ k(p(x), y).
As a diagram,
x
X p Y
k
R
R′
Y ′
Suppose we have concrete open games G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) and H : (X ′, S′)→ (Y ′, R′) and
we wish to combine them to create some game G ⊗ H : (X ×X ′, S × S′) → (Y × Y ′, R × R′).
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Consider the left context operator L acting on some triple (x′, p′, k). If k is an outcome
function for the game G⊗H and H observes x′ and plays according to the function p′, then
L(x′, p′, k) is the ‘apparent’ outcome function for G. Similarly, R(x, p, k) is the ‘apparent’
outcome function for H when G observes x and plays according to p. With this in mind,
we dene tensor composition for concrete open games as follows.
Definition 2.22 (Tensor composition of concrete open games). Let G : (X,S) → (Y,R) and H :
(X ′, S′)→ (Y ′, R′) be concrete open games. Define
G ⊗H : (X ×X ′, S × S′)→ (Y × Y ′, R×R′)
by
1. ΣG⊗H = ΣG × ΣH,
2. PG⊗H(σ, τ) = PG(σ)⊗ PH(τ) (in CL),
3. BG⊗H :
(
(X ×X ′)× (Y × Y ′ → R×R′)
)
→ Rel(ΣG⊗H) is given by
BG⊗H
(
(x, x′)?, k?
)
(σ, τ) = BG
(
x?,L(x′, (PH(τ))v, k)?
)
(σ)
× BH
(
x′?,R(x, (PG(σ))v, k)?
)
(τ)
G ⊗H is represented by the diagram
G
X
S
Y
R
H
X′
S′
Y ′
R′ .
2.9 Equivalence of open games
One subtlety remains before we can dene the category of concrete open games. We aim
to dene a category with object class Set × Set and morphisms given by concrete open
games. If carried out naïvely, this runs into the problem that strategy sets which should be
identical are merely isomorphic. For instance, the strategy set of (G◦H)◦K is (ΣG×ΣH)×ΣK
whilst the strategy set of G ◦ (H ◦ K) is ΣG × (ΣH × ΣK). In order for concrete open games
to form a category, we must rst take an appropriate quotient. We do this by dening a
notion of simulation between concrete open games of the same type.1
1Bisimulations are a refinement of previously-considered notions of equivalence between open games.
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Definition 2.23. A relation α : A  B is serial if for all a ∈ A there exists some b ∈ B such that
α(a, b).
Definition 2.24. Let G,H : (X,S) → (Y,R) be concrete open games. A simulation α : G → H is
given by a serial relation α : ΣG  ΣH such that, for all σ, σ′ ∈ ΣG , τ ∈ ΣH, and c ∈ X × (Y → R), if
α(σ, τ) then
1. PG(σ) = PH(τ); and
2. σ′ ∈ BG(c)(σ) =⇒ ∃τ ′ ∈ ΣH such that α(σ′, τ ′) and τ ′ ∈ BH(c)(τ).
Definition 2.25. Let G,H : (X,S)→ (Y,R) be concrete open games. G and H are equivalent, writen
G ∼ H, if there exists a simulation α : G → H where the converse relation αc : H → G is also a
simulation. In this instance we say that α is a bisimulation of open games. We write [G] for the
equivalence class of G under this relation. We also say that the relation α witnesses the equivalence
between G and H and write G α∼ H.
The following results demonstrate that sequential and tensor composition of concrete
open respects equivalence of concrete open games.
Lemma 2.26. Let G,G′ : (X,S) → (Y,R) and H,H′ : (Y,R) → (Z,Q) be concrete open games. If
G ∼ G′ and H ∼ H′, then G ◦ H ∼ G′ ◦ H′.
Proof. Suppose G α∼ H and G′ β∼ H′. Then α× β : ΣG × ΣG  ΣG′ × ΣH′ given by
(α× β)((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)⇔ α(σ, σ′) and β(τ, τ ′)
is such that G ⊗H α×β∼ G′ ⊗H′.
Lemma 2.27. Let G,H : (X,S)→ (Y,R) and G′,H′ : (X ′, S′)→ (Y ′, R′) be concrete open games. If
G ∼ H and G′ ∼ H′, then G ⊗ G′ ∼ H⊗H′.
Proof. If G α∼ H and G′ β∼ H′, then G ⊗ G′ α×β∼ H⊗H′ as in the previous lemma.
In addition to its utility for dening a category of concrete open games, quotienting
by equivalence rules out some pathological behaviour. Given a game G : (X,S) → (Y,R),
we can dene G′ : (X,S)→ (Y,R) where ΣG′ = ΣG + ΣG and where the behaviour of G′ is the
same on both copies of ΣG. G and G′ are distinct, but equivalent concrete open games.
Notation 2.28. We write al ∈ A+A or ar ∈ A+A to signify that al and ar are members of the left
and right copies of A respectively.
Example 2.29. Let G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) be a concrete open game. Define G′ : (X,S)→ (Y,R) by
1. ΣG′ = ΣG + ΣG ;
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2. PG′(σ) = PG(σ); and
3. For all c ∈ X × (Y → R) and i ∈ {l, r},
BG′(c)(σi) =
{
τi ∈ ΣG + ΣG
∣∣∣ τ ∈ BG(c)(σ)}.
Let β : ΣG  ΣG + ΣG be the relation given by σ
β∼ σi for i ∈ {l, r}. Then β witnesses the equivalence
between G and G′.
2.10 The category of concrete open games
We are now nally in a position to show that concrete open games form a symmetric
monoidal category.
Notation 2.30. In string diagrams we refer to a play function applied to a strategy simply by the
strategy. For example, σ may refer to PG(σ). In practice this does not lead to ambiguity because
proofs and definitions proceed by assigning fixed strategies to particular open games. This notational
conventions allows for less cluttered string diagrams.
Lemma 2.31. Sequential composition of concrete open game equivalence classes is associative.
The identity morphism (X,S)→ (X,S) is given by the computation 〈idX , idS〉.
Lemma 2.32. Let G : (X,S)→ (Y,R). Then [G] = [G ◦ 〈idX , idS〉] = [〈idY , idR〉 ◦ G].
Corollary 2.33. There is a category ConGame with object class Set× Set and equivalence classes
of concrete open games as morphisms.
We now move on to proving that ConGame is symmetric monoidal.
Lemma 2.34. ⊗ : ConGame×ConGame→ ConGame is a functor.
Lemma 2.35. The associator in ConGame is natural.
We include the proof of this lemma specically because it will be important later.
Proof. Let Gi : (Xi, Si)→ (Yi, Ri) be open games where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We need to show that α ◦ (G1 ⊗
(G2 ⊗ G3)) ∼ ((G1 ⊗ G2)⊗ G3) ◦ α. Define β : (ΣG1 × (ΣG2 ×ΣG3))× {?} {?} × ((ΣG1 ×ΣG2)×ΣG3)
by
(
(σ, (τ, µ)), ?
) β∼ (?, ((σ, τ), µ)).
As CL is symmetric monoidal, we have that
α ◦ PG1⊗(G2⊗G3)(σ, (τ, µ)) = P(G1⊗G2)⊗G2((σ, τ), µ) ◦ α.
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Let xi ∈ Xi and k : (Y1 × Y2 × Y3) → (R1 × R2 × R3). We will show that the local contexts for
G1,G2, and G3 are the same in both G1 ⊗ (G2 ⊗ G2) and (G1 ⊗ G2) ⊗ G3. First we consider G1. Let
k′ := L(x3,PG3µ, k). Then,
kG1 := L
(
(x2, x3),PG2⊗G3(τ, µ), k
)
=
(x2, x3) (τ ⊗ µ)v
X2
X3
Y2 k
Y3
Y1
R1
=
x2
x3
X2 τv
X3
µv
Y2
k
Y3
Y1
R1
=
x2
X2 τv
Y2
k′
R1Y1
= L
(
x2,PG2(τ),L
(
x3,PG3µ, k
))
Similar arguments hold for G2 and G3, showing that
kG2 := R
(
x1,PG1(σ),L
(
x3,PG3(µ), k
))
= L
(
x3,PG3(µ),R
(
x1,PG1(σ), k
))
and
kG3 := R
(
(x1, x2),PG1⊗G2(σ, τ), k
)
= R
(
x2,PG2(τ),R
(
x1,PG1(σ), k
))
.
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Then
Bα◦(G1⊗(G2⊗G3))
(
(x1, (x2, x3)), k
)(
?, (σ, (τ, µ))
)
=B? ×
(
BG1(x1, kG1)(σ)×
(
BG2(x2, kG2)(τ)× BG3(x3, kG3)(µ)
))
β∼
((
BG1(x1, kG1)(σ)× BG2(x2, kG2)(τ)
)
× BG3(x3, kG3)(µ)
)
× B?
=B((G1⊗G2)⊗G3)◦α
(
((x1, x2), x3), k
)(
((σ, τ), µ), ?
)
where B? is the total best response relation of α.
The above lemma relies on the fact that the monoidal tensor in Set is cartesian. In
particular we needed that bipartite states s : I → S1 ⊗ S2 in Set (i.e. elements of S1 × S2)
correspond to pairs of states (s1 : I → S1, s2 : I → S2). In an arbitrary monoidal category,
it need not be the case that for all states s : I → S1 ⊗ S2 there exist states s1 : I → S1 and
s2 : I → S2 such that
s
S1
S2
=
s1 S1
s2 S2
.
This poses a signicant barrier to generalising concrete open games to monoidal cate-
gories where the monoidal tensor is not cartesian, and Section 3 addresses this problem.
Lemma 2.36. The structural computations λ, ρ, and s are natural in ConGame.
Theorem 2.37. ConGame is symmetric monoidal.
2.11 Encoding functions as games
Recall that given, functions f : X → Y and g : R→ S, there is a computation concrete open
game 〈f, g〉 : (X,S)→ (Y,R). In fact, this operation is functorial.
Lemma 2.38 ( [Hed16]). Define F : Set×Setop → ConGame by F (X,S) = (X,S) and F (f : X →
Y, g : R→ S) = 〈f, g〉. Then F is a faithful monoidal functor.
We also incorporate computations directly into the diagrammatic calculus for concrete
open games, representing the computation 〈f, g〉 : (X,S)→ (Y,R) by
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fg
YX
S R .
Two particularly useful examples of this notation are the covariant and contravariant
copying computations 〈∆X , id〉 : (X, I) → (X ×X, id) and 〈id,∆R〉 : (I,R × R) → (I,R) which
are represented by
X
X
X
and
R
R
R
respectively.
2.12 Game theory with concrete open games
In this section we give some examples of games modeled using concrete open games. We
will be light on details, aiming to simply demonstrate some of the expressive power of
concrete open games. We direct the reader to [Hed16] for more details.
2.12.1 Bimatrix games
Bimatrix games are simply two player normal form games, the most well-known example
of which is likely the prisoners’ dilemma. We assume the set of actions available to each
player is nite for simplicity.
Definition 2.39. A bimatrix game consists in
1. Finite set of actions A and B; and
2. An outcome function k : A×B → R2.
A bimatrix game G = (A,B, k) is represented by the concrete open game
A
B
ck
A
B
R
R
where A and B are utility maximising agents and ck is the counit game associated with
k. In diagrammatic form, the structure of the game is made clear. Players A and B
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make independent choices from A and B respectively which are then used to generate
two real numbers as outcomes. Bimatrix games may not have a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies, but in cases that do have Nash equilibria, they appear as xed points of the
best resonse function of the above concrete open game.
2.12.2 Two player sequential game
A two player sequential game is dened by the same data as a bimatrix game (sets A and
B and a function k : A × B → R2), but we allow the second player to observe the rst
player’s move before making a choice, so strategies for the second player are functions
A→ B. This is represented by the concrete open game
A
X
B
Y ck
where A and B are utility maximising agents and ck is the counit game associated with k.
Crucially, the xed points of the concrete open game are not subgame perfect Nash
equilibria, but rather plain old Nash equilibria. It is also possible to dene a concrete open
game that captures subgame perfect equilibria, but this requires an additional operator
dened in [GKLF18].
2.12.3 Normal form games
Let ((Si)ni=1, (ki)ni=1) be a normal form game for n players. Dene k : ∏ni=1 Si → Rn by
s = (s1, · · · , sn) 7→ (q1(s), · · · , qn(s)). We canmodel this normal form game using the concrete
open game
ck ◦
( n⊗
i=1
Ai
)
where Ai : I → (Si,R) is the utility maximising agent. The xed points of this game are
then the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the normal form game.
3 General open games
3.1 Generalising concrete lenses
In the proof of lemma 2.4 we made use of the fact that every Set function is a comonoid
homomorphism for the copy/delete comonoid. Recall that a morphism is a comonoid
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homomorphism if it can be ‘moved through’ the comonoid structure.
f =
f
f
f =
If Set is replaced with some arbitrary symmetricmonoidal category C and the copy/delete
comonoid is replaced with some arbitrary comonoid in C, sequential composition of lenses,
as dened in denition 2.3, may not be associative. This presents a substantive problem
— there exist categories relevant to game theory in which sequential composition of con-
crete lenses is not associative. Of particular interest is the Kleisli category of the nitary
distribution monad, Kl(D), which we will need in order to model Bayesian games (dis-
cussed in Section 4). Kl(D) inherits a copy/delete comonoid from Set, but its comonoid
homorphisms are the deterministic maps (i.e. precisely the non-probabilistic maps).
In the next section we introduce coends, a piece of categorical machinery that allows for
an elegant generalisation of concrete lenses to arbitrary symmetric monoidal categories.
We call these generalised lenses coend lenses or, simply, lenses. We will rst introduce the
technical notion before magicking it away with a diagrammatic calculus that represents
what is ‘really’ going on.
3.2 Co-wedges and Coends
Co-wedges are a variant of natural transformations applying to functors that act both
covariantly and contravariantly on an argument. In section 2.1 we noted that lenses have
both covariant and contravariant components. We will see that this behaviour can be
described by coends, which are initial co-wedges. For extra motivation, discussion, and
examples, we refer the reader to [Lor15].
Definition 3.1 (Co-wedge). Let F : Cop × C → D be a functor. A co-wedge c : F → α is an object
α : D together with maps {ca : F (a, a) → α ∣∣ a : C} such that, for any morphism f : a′ → a, the
diagram
α F (a, a)
F (a′, a′) F (a′, a)
ca
ca′
F (a′, f)
F (f, a)
commutes.
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Definition 3.2 (Coend). A coend is a couniversal co-wedge. Diagrammatically, the coend of a functor
F : Cop × C → D is a co-wedge {ca : F (a, a) → coend(F ) ∣∣ a : C} such that for any other co-wedge{
da : F (a, a)→ α
∣∣ a : C} and morphism f : a′ → a the diagram
coend(F ) F (a, a)
F (a′, a′) F (a′, a)
α
F (f, a)
F (a′, f)
ca
ca′
da
da′
h
commutes for a unique morphism h : coend(F )→ α.
We adopt the integral notation co-ends, writing
∫ a:C
F (a, a)
for coend(F ). We will make use of the fact that coends can be characterised by the following
coequaliser.
Lemma 3.3. Let F : Cop ×C → D. If D is cocomplete and C is small, the coend ∫ a:C F (a, a) is given
by the coequaliser of the following pair of arrows.
∐
a,a′:C
f :a′→a
F (a, a′)
∐
a:C
F (a, a)
F1
F2
Where the f : a′ → a components of F1 and F2 are F (f, a′) and F (a, f) respectively.
When C is not small (as is usually the case), we need to show directly that coends exist.
3.3 Coend lenses
Much of the work in this section is worked out in much greater detail in [Ril18], which
serves a good standard reference for coend lenses. We rst give an abstract denition of
coend lenses, then provide some justication.
Definition 3.4 (Coend lens). Let X,S, Y, and R be objects in a symmetric monoidal category C. A
coend lens l : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is an element of the set
∫ A:C
C(X,A⊗ Y )× C(A⊗R,S)
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We think of the coend in the above denition as acting as a kind of existential quan-
tier over the type variable A, followed by a quotient (to be described) over the resulting
structure. That is, a coend lens l : (X,S) → (Y,R) consists in an equivalence relation over
triples comprised of a choice of type A, a morphism v : X → A⊗Y , and another morphism
u : A⊗R→ S.
By lemma 3.3 we can characterise coend lenses (X,S) → (Y,R) as the elements of a
particular coequaliser. Moreover, coequalisers in Set are given by quotients. Unpacking
the coequaliser explicitly, coend lenses (X,S)→ (Y,R) are given by the set of triples of the
form described above, quotiented by the equivalence relation generated by
(
(f ⊗ idY ) ◦ v, u
) ∼ (v, u ◦ (f ⊗ idR))
for all A,B : C and f : A→ B. In diagrammatic form, the pair
v
f B
Y
A
X , u S
B
R
is related to the pair
vX
A
Y ,
f
u S
A
R
B
.
We refer to the types A and B as bound types (B is bound in the rst diagram, A in the
second). In Section 4, we will see that this bound type keeps track of correlations between
random variables in the Kleisli category of the distribution monad.
In vague terms, two pairs of morphisms are related if one can get from one to the other
by ‘sliding’ a morphism o the bound type of one morphism on to the bound type of the
other. Given a pair of morphisms (v : X → A ⊗ Y, u : A ⊗ R → S), we write [v, u] for their
equivalence class. When we need to talk explicitly about the bound type of [v, u] we write
[A, v, u] to specify that the pair (v, u) has bound type A. We also adopt the convention that
l = [Al, lv, lu] where, as with concrete lenses, we say that lv is the viewmorphism and lu is the
updatemorphism. We follow [Ril18], taking the hint from the diagrammatic representation
of the equivalence relation by representing a coend lens [v, u] : (X,S)→ (Y,R) as
v
Y
u
R
X S
.
We usually omit the bound type in diagrams for clarity. The equivalence relation is then
simply
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vX
Y
u
R
f
S ∼ vX
Y
u
R
f
S
The equivalence relation permits the cancelling of isomorphisms.
v
Y
u
R
X S ∼ vX
f f−1
u
Y R
S
.
Many proofs in this Section proceed by allowing symmetric monoidal structure to interact
with coend structure as, for example, in the following diagram.
vX
Y
u
R
S ∼ vX u
Y R
S
.
We suspect that this notation corresponds to a graphical calculus on a par with the
various calculi for monoidal categories, but verifying this falls outside the scope of this
paper. We pass the buck and consider these diagrams as mere short-hand. The cases
relevant to us in this work are certainly not problematic. We also note that these diagrams
appear to be a sort of dual to those for the operad of wiring diagrams [Spi13], swapping
the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.
Example 3.5 (Identity lens). The identity lens id(X,S) : (X,S) → (X,S) is given by [idX : X →
X, idS : S → S]. Diagrammatically,
X X SS
Example 3.6. A pair of morphisms (f : X → Y, g : R → S) is encoded by the coend lens [I, f, g] :
(X,S)→ (Y,R):
fX Y gR S
Definition 3.7 (Sequential composition of coend lenses). Let [v, u] : (X,S) → (Y,R) and [v′, u′] :
(Y,R)→ (Z,Q) be coend lenses. Define [v′, u′] ◦ [v, u] : (X,S)→ (Z,Q) to be
vX
v′
Y Z
u′
Q
u
R
S
.
Explicitly,
[v′, u′, A′] ◦ [v, u,A] = [(v′ ⊗ idA) ◦ v, u ◦ (idA ⊗ u′), A⊗A′].
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Theorem 3.8 (Coend lenses form a category). Suppose C is a category such that, for all objects
X,S, Y,R ∈ C, ∫ A:C
C(X,A⊗ Y )× C(A⊗R,S)
exists. Then there is a category LensC with object class C × C and where
LensC
(
(X,S), (Y,R)
)
=
∫ A:C
C(X,A⊗ Y )× C(A⊗R,S)
.
When C is small, the existence of the coend lens types are guaranteed by the cocom-
pleteness of Set. When C is not small, and the lens types correspond to coends indexed
by a large category, we must verify that these types exist by some other means (by, for
example, giving a Set isomorphism). Fortunately, this is not dicult for the categories
of interest in this work.
Definition 3.9 (Tensor composition of coend lenses). Let [v, u] : (X,S) → (Y,R) and [v′, u′] :
(X ′, S′)→ (Y ′, R′) be coend lenses. Define [v, u]⊗ [v′, u′] : (X ⊗X ′, S ⊗ S′)→ (Y ⊗ Y ′, R⊗R′) to be
vX
v′X′
Y ′
Y
u′
u
R′
R
S
S′
.
Explicitly, [v, u,A]⊗ [v′, u′, A′] is given by
[
(idA ⊗ sY,A′ ⊗ idY ′) ◦ (v ⊗ v′), (u⊗ u′) ◦ (idA ⊗ sA′,R ⊗ idR′), A⊗A′
]
Theorem 3.10 (LensC is symmetric monoidal). The category LensC is symmetric monoidal with
the tensor given in definition 3.9, monoidal unit I = (IC , IC), and with structural morphisms inherited
from C given by
α(X,A),(Y,B),(Z,C) = [αX,Y,Z , α−1A,B,C ]
λ(X,A) = [λX , λ−1A ]
ρ(X,A) = [ρX , ρ−1A ]
s(X,A),(Y,B) = [sX,Y , sB,A]
Lemma 3.11. When ⊗ is cartesian, LensC is isomorphic to CLC .
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3.4 Towards generalising open games
We could, at this point, attempt to dene a (generalised) open game G : (X,S) → (Y,R)
over a symmetric monoidal category C as
1. A set Σ of strategies;
2. A play function P : Σ→ Lens((X,S), (Y,R)); and
3. A best response function B : C(I,X)× C(Y,R)→ Rel(Σ).
Call such generalised open games interim open games (for they will not live long). Se-
quential composition and tensor composition of interim open games could be dened
much as we did for concrete open games. The problems begin to arise when one attempts
to prove that this denition results in a symmetric monoidal category.
In proving that the associator was natural in CL, we used the fact that the monoidal
tensor in Set is cartesian. If the tensor of C is not cartesian, the local context of G in
G ⊗ (H⊗K) is dierent to the local context of G in (G ⊗H)⊗K. Let
G : (X1, S1)→ (Y1, R1)
H : (X2, S2)→ (Y2, R2)
K : (X3, S3)→ (Y3, R3)
be interim open games, p ∈ C(I,X1 ⊗ X2 ⊗ X3), k ∈ C(Y1 ⊗ Y2 ⊗ Y3, R1 ⊗ R2 ⊗ R3), and
(σ, τ, µ) ∈ ΣG × ΣH × ΣK. The local context of G in G ⊗ (H⊗K) is given by
p
X2 τv
µv
X3
Y2
k
Y3
Y1
R1
whilst the local context of G in (G ⊗H)⊗K is given by
p
X2 τv
p
X3 µv
Y2
k
Y3
Y1
R1
.
In general, these morphisms are not the same. In the case where C is the kleisli category
of the distribution monad, the rst morphism contains information about correlations
27
between the types X2 and X3 whilst the second morphism does not. Consequently, the
distinction between these two local contexts for G is substantive. Fortunately, coend
lenses also provide a solution to this problem.
The high level approach for dening a category of generalised open games is to use as
few ‘deleting’ maps as possible. We do this by ‘hiding’ information in the bound variable
of a coend lens whenever we would otherwise delete it. A consequence of this approach is
that the correct denition of a ‘context’ for generalised open games is quite abstract, but
we will see this abstractness allows for more elegant proofs and, in any case, disappears
when dealing with the categories we are actually interested in.
3.5 States, continuations, and contexts
In this section we dene a generalised notion of context for open games. Observe that a
state [s, s′] ∈ LensC(I, (X,S)) has the form
s
X
s′
S .
More verbosely, a state s ∈ LensC(I, (X,S)) is the equivalence class of a choice of type
A : C together with a state s : C(I, A ⊗ X) in C and an eect s′ : C(A ⊗ S, I) in C. A useful
interpretation of states in LensC is as a history/cohistory pair. (Cohistories are not yet well
understood. They make proofs easier, but vanish in categories which make game theoretic
sense.)
An eect [e, e′] ∈ LensC((Y,R), I) has the form
eY
I I
e′ R
.
Concerning eects, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.12. C(Y,R) ∼= LensC((Y,R), I)
Proof. The isomorphism i : C(Y,R)→ LensC((X,S), (Y,R)) is given by
i(f : Y → R) = [R, f, idR] = [Y, idY , f ]
This result captures the idea that ‘eects in LensC are outcome functions in C.’
28
We can now dene (generalised) contexts which consist in a coend over a state in LensC
(a history/cohistory pair) and an eect in LensC (an outcome function). Contexts are
therefore members of a double coend. This double coend turns out to be a state in the
double lens category LensLensC . From a purely technical standpoint, using double lenses
allows for elegant proofs. From a heuristics perspective, we will see that the extra bound
variable the double lens aords us enables us, in the case C = Kl(D), to store information
about correlations between variables where we would otherwise have to take marginals.
Definition 3.13 (Context functor). The context functor C : LensC × LensopC → Set is given by
C(Φ,Ψ) =
∫ Θ:LensC
LensC(I,Θ⊗ Φ)× LensC(Θ⊗Ψ, I)
= LensLensC (I, (Φ,Ψ))
Elements of C(Φ,Ψ) are called contexts.
As a context [p, k] ∈ C(Φ,Ψ) is just a state in LensLensC , it admits a graphical represen-
tation as
p
Φ
k
Ψ .
This is neat, and means many of the results in the rest of this Section can be carried out
graphically.
3.6 General open games
We have now arrived at a level of generality where we can dene generalised open games
in a way that is obviously analogous to concrete open games. Given Φ,Ψ ∈ LensC, an
open game consists in a set of strategy proles, a family of lenses indexed by the set of
strategy proles, and a best response function which takes a context as input and returns
a relation on strategy proles.
Definition 3.14 (Open game). Let Φ,Ψ ∈ LensC . An open game G : Φ→ Ψ consists in
1. A set of strategy profiles Σ;
2. A play function P : Σ→ LensC(Φ,Ψ); and
3. A best response function B : C(Φ,Ψ)→ Rel(Σ).
The rationale here is much the same as it is with concrete open games. The play
function takes a strategy prole as input and returns a lens describing an open play of the
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game. Best response takes a context as argument that provides the information necessary
for the game to make informed strategic decisions, and returns a relation on strategies.
As with concrete open games, we dene a notion of atomic open game.
Definition 3.15. An atomic open game a : Φ→ Ψ is an open game such that
1. Σa ⊆ LensC(Φ,Ψ);
2. For all l ∈ Σa, Pa(l) = l; and
3. For all contexts c ∈ C(Φ,Ψ), Ba(c) is constant.
Atomic open games are uniquely specied by a subset Σ ⊆ LensC(Φ,Ψ) and a preference
function ε : C(Φ,Ψ)→ P(Σ). We refer to atomic open games simply as atoms.
Example 3.16. The identity atom idΦ : Φ→ Φ is given by Σ = {idΦ}, ε(c) = {idΦ} for all c ∈ C(Φ,Ψ).
Example 3.17 (Computation). Let f : C(X,Y ) and g : C(R,S) be morphisms in C. Define the atom
〈f, g〉 : (X,S)→ (Y,R) by
1. Σ〈f,g〉 = {[f, g]}; and
2. B〈f,g〉(c) = {[f, g]} for all c ∈ C
(
(X,S), (Y,R)
)
.
3.7 Composing open games
The heuristic for sequential composition of general open games is much the same as for
concrete open games in section 2.7. The only dierence is that we are now using coend
lenses rather than concrete lenses, and contexts also are slightly dierent. Best response
of a sequential composite H ◦ G is still dened by forming local contexts for G and H.
Definition 3.18 (Sequential composition of open games). Let G : Φ → Ψ and H : Ψ → Ξ be open
games. Define H ◦ G : Φ→ Ξ by
1. ΣH◦G = ΣG × ΣH,
2. PH◦G(σ, τ) = PH(τ) ◦ PG(σ),
3. BH◦G [p, k](σ, τ) = BG [p, k ◦ PH(τ)](σ)× BH[PG(σ) ◦ p, k](τ).
Given a context [p, k] ∈ C(Φ,Ξ) represented by the diagram
p
Φ
k
Ψ
the local context for G given a strategy τ ∈ ΣH is given by
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pΦ τΨ
Ξ
k
and given a strategy σ ∈ ΣG the local context for H is given by
p
Φ
σ Ψ
k
Ξ .
In this representation the process of taking a local context is non-arbitrary, and obviously
associative.
3.8 The tensor of open games
Again, the heursistic for dening the tensor of open games is much as it was for concrete
open games. We will rst formalise the notion of ‘local context’ for tensored general open
games.
Definition 3.19 (Local contexts for tensor composition). Define the left local context function
LΦ,Φ′,Ψ,Ψ′ : C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′)× LensC(Φ′,Ψ′)→ C(Φ,Ψ)
by
L([p, k], l) =
p l
Φ′
Φ
k
Ψ
Ψ′
.
Define the right local context function
RΦ,Φ′,Ψ,Ψ′ : C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′)× LensC(Φ,Ψ)→ C(Φ′,Ψ′)
by
R([p, k], l) =
p l
Φ
Φ′
k
Ψ
Ψ′
.
We will usually suppress the subscripts of L and R as the types can be inferred from
context.
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Definition 3.20 (Tensor composition of open games). Let G : Φ → Ψ and H : Φ′ → Ψ′ be open
games. Define G ⊗H : Φ⊗ Φ′ → Ψ⊗Ψ′ by
• ΣG⊗H = ΣG × ΣH;
• PG⊗H(σ, τ) = PG(σ)⊗ PH(τ) (in LensC);
• Define BG⊗H : C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′)→ Rel(ΣG⊗H) by
BG⊗H(c)(σ, τ) = BG(L(c,PH(τ)))(σ)× BH(R(c,PG(σ)))(τ)
3.9 Equivalence of open games
As in section 2.9, we need to quotient open games in order to obtain a category.
Definition 3.21 (Simulation of open games). Let G,H : Φ → Ψ be open games. A simulation of
open games α : G → H is a serial relation α : ΣG → ΣH such that, for all σ, σ′ ∈ ΣG , τ ∈ ΣH, and
c : C(Φ,Ψ), α(σ, τ) implies that
1. PG(σ) = PH(τ); and
2. σ′ ∈ BG(c)(σ)⇒ ∃τ ′ ∈ ΣH such that α(σ′, τ ′) and τ ′ ∈ BH(c)(τ).
Definition 3.22 (Equivalence of open games). Let G,H : Φ → Ψ be open games. G and H are
equivalent, written G ∼ H, if there is a simulation α : G → H such that the converse relation
αc : H → G is also a simulation of open games. We say that α is a bisimulation of open games and
write [G] for the equivalence class of G under this relation.
Lemma 3.23. Let G,G′ : Φ→ Ψ, H,H′ : Ψ→ Ξ, and K,K′ : Φ′ → Ψ′ be open games. Then
1. If G ∼ G′ and H ∼ H′, then H ◦ G ∼ H′ ◦ G′; and
2. If G ∼ G′ and K ∼ K′, then G ⊗ K ∼ G′ ⊗K′.
Demonstrating equivalence in the cases of interest will always be trivial, and so we
simply specify the witnessing relation between strategy sets.
3.10 The category of open games
That equivalences classes of open games form a category follows easily from the fact that
coend lenses form a category.
Lemma 3.24. Sequential composition of equivalence classes of open games is associative.
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Proof. Suppose we have open games
Φ
G
Ψ H Ξ K Υ.
The equivalence between (K ◦ H) ◦ G and K ◦ (H ◦ G) will be witnessed by the relation β : ΣG ×
(ΣH × ΣK)  (ΣG × ΣH) × ΣK generated by (σ, (τ, µ)) β∼ ((σ, τ), µ). Let σ ∈ ΣG , τ ∈ ΣH, and
µ ∈ ΣK. Then P(K◦H)◦G)(σ, (τ, µ)) = PK◦(H◦G)((σ, τ), µ) by associativity of composition in LensC . Let
[p, k] ∈ C(Φ,Υ) be a context. Then
B(K◦H)◦G([p, k])(σ, (τ, µ))
= BG
([
p, k ◦ PK(µ) ◦ PH(τ)
])
(σ)
×
(
BH
([
PG(σ) ◦ p, k ◦ PK(µ)
])
(τ)× BK
([
PH(τ) ◦ PG(σ) ◦ p, k
])
(µ)
)
β∼
(
BG
([
p, k ◦ PK(µ) ◦ PH(τ)
])
(σ)× BH
([
PG(σ) ◦ p, k ◦ PK(µ)
])
(τ)
)
× BK
([
PH(τ) ◦ PG(σ) ◦ p, k
])
(µ)
= BK◦(H◦G)([p, k])((σ, τ), µ)
Theorem 3.25. If LensC exists, there exists a categoryGameC with object class C×C and equivalence
classes of open games as morphisms.
Proof. All that remains to be checked is that the identity computation defined in example 3.16 is an
identity morphism, and this follows from easy checks.
3.11 The symmetric monoidal structure of open games
We now prove that⊗ is functorial. The proof is a good demonstration of the utility of coend
diagrams. In the commutative squares in the following lemma, the top path describes how
local contexts are formed in, say, (H⊗H′)◦(G⊗G′) and the bottom path describes how local
contexts are formed in (H◦G)⊗ (H′ ◦ G′). That the squares commute follows by inspection
of the appropriate coend diagrams.
Lemma 3.26. Suppose we have coend lenses
Φ Ψ Ξ
Φ′ Ψ′ Ξ′
l m
l′ m′
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The following diagrams commute:
1.
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(Φ,Ξ)
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′) C(Φ,Ψ)
L(−, l′ ◦m′)
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,m⊗m′) C(Φ,m)
L(−, l′)
2.
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(Φ,Ξ)
C(Ψ⊗Ψ′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(Ψ,Ξ)
L(−, l′ ◦m′)
C(l ⊗ l′,m⊗m′) C(l,Ξ)
L(−,m′)
3.
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(Φ′,Ξ′)
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ψ⊗Ψ′) C(Φ′,Ψ′)
R(−, l ◦m)
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,m⊗m′) C(Φ,m)
R(−, l)
4.
C(Φ⊗ Φ′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(Φ′,Ξ′)
C(Ψ⊗Ψ′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(Ψ′,Ξ′)
R(−, l ◦m)
C(l ⊗ l′,Ξ⊗ Ξ′) C(l′,Ξ′)
R(−,m)
Proof. The four squares are given respectively by the following equalities of coend diagrams:
1.
p
l′Φ′ m
′
Ψ′
ΦΞ′
m
Ψ
kΞ
Ξ′
=
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pl′Φ′ ΦΞ′ m
′
m
Ψ
kΞ
Ξ′
2.
p
l′Φ′ m
′
Ψ′
Φ
l
Ξ′
Ψ
k
Ξ
Ξ′
=
p l
Φ
l′Φ′ m
′
Ψ′
Ψ
Ξ′
k
Ξ
3.
p l
Φ
m
Ψ
Φ′ m′Ψ
k
Ξ′
Ξ
=
p l
Φ
Φ′ m′Ξ′
k
Ξ′
m
Ψ Ξ
4.
p l
Φ
m
Ψ
Φ′ l
′ Ψ′
k
Ξ′
Ξ
=
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p l
Φ
m
Ψ
l′
Φ′
Ψ′
k
Ξ′
Functoriality of the tensor in GameC then follows easily.
Corollary 3.27. ⊗ : GameC ×GameC → GameC is a functor.
Proof. Suppose we have open games
Φ Ψ Ξ
Φ′ Ψ′ Ξ′
G H
G′ H′
Note that Σ(H◦G)⊗(H′◦G′) = (ΣG ×ΣH)× (ΣG′ ×ΣH′) and Σ(H⊗H′)◦(G⊗G′) = (ΣG ×ΣG′)× (ΣH×ΣH′).
The relation β : (ΣG × ΣH) × (ΣG′ × ΣH′)  (ΣG × ΣG′) × (ΣH × ΣH′) witnessing the equivalence
between (H ◦ G)⊗ (H′ ◦ G′) and (H⊗H′) ◦ (G ⊗ G′) is generated by ((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′) β∼ ((σ, σ′), (τ, τ ′)).
LensC is symmetric monoidal and, hence,
P(H◦G)⊗(H′⊗G′)((σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)) = P(H⊗H′)◦(G⊗G)((σ, σ′), (τ, τ ′)).
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Using lemma 3.26,
B(H◦G)⊗(H′◦G′)(c)
(
(σ, τ), (σ′, τ ′)
)
=
(
BG
(
C(Φ,PH(τ)) ◦ L(−,PH′(τ ′) ◦ PG′(σ′))(c)
)
(σ)
× BH
(
C(PG(σ),Ξ) ◦ L(−,PH′(τ ′) ◦ PG′(σ′))(c)
)
(τ)
)
×
(
BG′
(
C(Φ′,PH′(τ ′)) ◦ R(−,PH(τ) ◦ PH(σ))(c)
)
(σ′)
× BH′
(
C(PG′(σ′),Ξ′) ◦ R(i,PH(τ) ◦ PH(σ))(c)
)
(τ ′)
)
β∼
(
BG
(
L(−,PG′(σ′)) ◦ C(Φ⊗ Φ′,PH(τ)⊗ PH′(τ ′))(c)
)
(σ)
× BG′
(
R(−,PG(σ)) ◦ C(Φ⊗ Φ′,PH(τ)⊗ PH′(τ ′))(c)
)
(σ′)
)
×
(
BH
(
L(−,PH′(τ ′)) ◦ C(PG(σ)⊗ PG′(σ′),Ξ⊗ Ξ′)(c)
)
(τ)
× BH′
(
R(−,PH(τ)) ◦ C(PG(σ)⊗ PG′(σ′),Ξ⊗ Ξ′)(c)
)
(τ ′)
)
= B(H⊗H′)◦(G⊗G′)(c)
(
(σ, σ′), (τ, τ ′)
)
Definition 3.28. The structural isomorphisms in GameC are given by
α(X,A),(Y,B),(Z,C) = 〈αX,Y,Z , α−1A,B,C〉
ρ(X,A) = 〈ρX , ρ−1A 〉
λ(X,A) = 〈λX , λ−1A 〉
s(X,A),(Y,B) = 〈sX,Y , sB,Y 〉
Lemma 3.29. The structural isomorphisms are natural in GameC .
Proof. We show that the associator is natural. Naturality of the other stuctural maps follow by similar
arguments. Let Gi : Φi → Ψi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that Σα◦(G1⊗(G2⊗G3)) =
(
ΣG1 × (ΣG2 ×ΣG3)
)×{α}
and Σ((G1⊗G2)⊗G3)◦α = {α} ×
(
(ΣG1 ×ΣG2)×ΣG3
)
. The equivalence between α ◦ (G1 ⊗ (G2 ⊗G3)) and(
(G1 ⊗ G2)⊗ G3
) ◦ α will be witness by the relation generated by ((σ, (τ, µ)), α) β∼ (α, ((σ, τ), µ)). Let
σ ∈ ΣG1 , τ ∈ ΣG2 , µ ∈ ΣG3 , and [p, k] ∈ C
(
(Φ1⊗ (Φ2⊗Φ3)), ((Ψ1⊗Ψ2)⊗Ψ3)
)
. We note that the local
context for G1 given this data is the same for both games. The local context of G1 is given by
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pτ
Φ2
µ
Φ1 Ψ1
Φ3
k
Ψ2
Ψ3
in α ◦ (G1 ⊗ (G2 ⊗ G3)) and by
p
τ
µ
Φ2
Φ3
Φ1 Ψ1
k
Ψ3
Ψ2
in
(
(G1 ⊗ G2)⊗ G3
) ◦ α. This two morphisms are evidently equal. Similar diagrams demonstrate that
the local contexts for G2 and G3 are the same in both games also.
Theorem 3.30. GameC is symmetric monoidal.
Proof. All that remains to be shown is that the MacLane pentagon and triangle axioms are satisfied,
but this follows easily as the underlying category C is symmetric monoidal.
3.12 Nice categories of open games
In this section we show how the notion of ‘cohistory’ collapses when the monoidal unit
I of the underlying monoidal category C is terminal. With cohistories gone, we will see
that GameC has a very natural game theoretic interpretation.
Lemma 3.31 ( [Ril18]). If the monoidal unit of C is terminal, then LensC(I, (X,S)) ∼= C(I,X).
The isomorphism i : C(I,X) → LensC(I, (X,S)) is explicitly given by p 7→ [p, !s]. In a
diagram,
p X 7→ p X S
Corollary 3.32. If the monoidal unit of C is terminal, then
C((X,S), (Y,R)) ∼= LensC((I,R), (X,Y ))
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Proof. Using 3.31 and the fact that C(Y,R) ∼= LensC
(
I, (Y,R)
)
(3.12),
C((X,S), (Y,R)) =
∫ (Θ,Θ′)∈LensC
LensC(I, (Θ⊗X,Θ′ ⊗ S))× LensC((Θ⊗ Y,Θ′ ⊗R), I)
∼=
∫ Θ:C
C(I,Θ⊗X)× C(Θ⊗ Y,R)
= LensC((I,R), (X,Y ))
Unpacking denitions, the isomorphism i : LensC((I,R), (X,Y )) → C((X,S), (Y,R)) is
explicitly given by
[p : I → Θ⊗X, k : Θ⊗ Y → R] 7→
[
[p, !S ], [k, idR]
]
.
In the case where the monoidal unit of C is terminal, the type of best response for an
open game G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is equivalently
BG : LensC((I,R), (X,Y ))→ Rel(ΣG).
We have seen that expessing contexts as states in the double lens category is a good level of
abstraction for categories of open games, allowing for elegant proofs with pretty diagrams.
From a game theoretic perspective, however, it will make more sense to express contexts
as equivalence classes [p, k,Θ] : LensC((I,R), (X,Y )). This is because a state p : C(I,Θ ⊗X)
is easily seen to correspond to a history for an open game and the function k : Θ⊗ Y → R
acts like an outcome function. In this way, we can specify a context for an open game in
much the same way as we did for concrete open games in section 2.
The coend diagram
p
X
k
Y
R
of a context [p, k] ∈ LensC((I,R), (X,Y )) neatly illustrates that a context is a game state
with a ‘hole’ in it. If we think of a game G : (X,S) → (Y,R) as a player in a larger game,
then p corresponds to the things that have happened in the game before G gets to act;
k corresponds to what will happen in the game after G acts; and the gap in the diagram
corresponds to the part of the gamewhere G gets to inuence the outcome. Alternatively, a
context is that which becomes a game once G has decided which strategy to play, whereby
playing that strategy will ll in the gap in the context.
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Given open games G : (X,S) → (Y,R), H : (Y,R) → (Z,Q), strategies σ ∈ ΣG , τ ∈ ΣH, and
a context [p, k] ∈ LensC((I,R), (X,Z)), the local context for G in H ◦ G is given by
p
X τvY
Z
k
Q
τu R
and the local context for H is given by
p
X
σv
Y
k
Z
Q
.
Given another open game K : (X ′, S′) → (Y ′, R′), a context [p, k] ∈ LensC((I,R ⊗ R′), (X ⊗
X ′, Y ⊗ Y ′)), and a strategy µ ∈ ΣH, the local contexts for G and H in G ⊗H are given by
p
X′ µv
X
k
Y ′
Y
R
R′
and
p X σv
X′
k
Y
Y ′
R
R′
respectively.
4 Bayesian open games
4.1 Commutative monads
Recall that a monad T over a monoidal category C is strong if it comes with a strength
natural transformation tA,B : A⊗ TB → T (A⊗B) satisfying various coherence conditions.
We have the following result guaranteeing the existence of a large class of coend lens
categories. We refer the reader to [Ril18] for a much more in-depth discussion of the
following result, and many more examples of when lens categories exist.
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Theorem 4.1 ( [Ril18]). If T is a strong monad, then LensKl(T ) exists2.
Definition 4.2 (Commutative monad). Let T be a strong monad with strength t over a monoidal
category C. Define the costrength natural transformation t′A,B : TA ⊗ B → T (A ⊗ B) to be the
composite
TA⊗B
sTA,B
B ⊗ TA
tB,A
T (B ⊗A) T (sB,A) T (A⊗B).
T is commutative if the diagram
TA⊗ TB
tTA,B
T (TA⊗B)
T (t′A,B)
T 2(A⊗B)
t′A,TB
T (A⊗ TB) T 2(A⊗B)
T (tA,B)
T (A⊗B)
µ
µ
commutes for all objects A and B in C.
If a monad is commutative then we get that its Kleisli category is symmetric monoidal
for free with the monoidal tensor ⊗ (on objects) and unit being the same as in the under-
lying category C .
Lemma 4.3 ( [PR97]). If T is a commutative monad over a symmetric monoidal category C, then
Kl(T ) is symmetric monoidal.
Commutative monads over Set also come with canonical copy/delete comonoid struc-
tures for every object. Copying cX : X → T (X ×X) is given by
X
∆
X ×X η T (X ×X)
and deleting dX : X → I is given by
X
! {?} η T ({?}) .
From this comonoid structure we obtain canonical projections
X ⊗ Y id⊗ d X ⊗ I ρ X
and
X ⊗ Y d⊗ id I ⊗ Y λ Y .
Crucially, it is not guaranteed that the monoidal tensor of Kl(T ) is cartesian.
2In [Ril18], lenses over a Kleisli category are called effectful optics.
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4.2 The category of sets and random functions
We now turn to the category of interest for this section.
The nitary distributionmonad D : Set→ Setmaps a set X to the set of nitary probabil-
ity distributions on X (nitary in the sense that only nitely many elements are assigned
non-zero probability).
Definition 4.4 (Finitary distribution monad). Define D : Set→ Set by
D(X) =
{
α : X → [0, 1]
∣∣∣ supp(X) < ℵ0, ∑
x∈supp(α)
α(x) = 1
}
where supp(α) is
{
x ∈ X ∣∣ α(x) 6= 0}, the support of α. D acts on morphisms by
D(f : X → Y )(α : D(X))(y) =
∑
f(x)=y
α(x).
The monad structure of D is given as follows. The unit is given by
ηX(x) = δx
where
δx(x′) =
1 if x = x
′
0 otherwise
and the extension f† : D(X)→ D(Y ) of f : X → D(Y ) is
f†(α) =
∑
x∈supp(α)
f(x)(y)
Lemma 4.5. D is a commutative monad.
Corollary 4.6. Kl(D) is symmetric monoidal with canonical copy/delete comonoids and projection
maps.
The monoidal tensor in Kl(D) is not cartesian.
Definition 4.7 (Copy/delete comonoid for Kl(D)). The copying map in Kl(D) is given explicitly by
cX : X → D(X ×X) where
c(x)(x1, x2) =
1 if x = x1 = x20 otherwise.
The monoidal unit of Kl(D) is terminal, and hence the deleting map dX : X → D({?}) must be given
by d(x)(?) = 1. As this map is unique, we refer to it as !.
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Whenever we are working in Kl(D) we denote cX and !X by
X
X
X and X
respectively.
The canonical projections in Kl(D) correspond to taking marginals.
Definition 4.8 (Marginals). Let p : D(X × Y ) be a joint distribution. The left marginal pX : D(X)
is given by pX(x) =
∑
y∈supp(p(x,−)) p(x, y). The right marginal pY : D(Y ) is given similarly by
pY (y) =
∑
x∈supp(p(−,y)) p(x, y). As diagrams, these are given by
p
Y
X
and p
X
Y
respectively.
An important operation on probability distributions is Bayesianupdatingwhere an agent
has some prior distribution (initial belief), makes an observation, and then updates their
prior to a new posterior distribution.
Definition 4.9 (Update operator). Let X and Θ be sets. We think of Θ as a type which an agent
has a probabilistic belief about, and X as a type that will be observed by an agent. Define the update
operator UΘ : D(Θ×X)→ (X → D(Θ)) by
UΘ(p)(x)(ϑ) = p(ϑ, x)∑
(ϑ′,x)∈supp(p) p(ϑ′, x)
.
We also write p(ϑ|x) for UΘ(p)(x)(ϑ).
Lemma 4.10. The update operator is natural in Θ. That is, the following diagram commutes for any
f : Θ1 → Θ2:
D(Θ1 ×X)
UΘ1
X → D(Θ1)
D(f ×X)
D(Θ2 ×X) UΘ2
X → D(Θ2)
◦D(f)
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Proof. Let p ∈ D(Θ1 ×X), x ∈ X,ϑ1 ∈ Θ1, and ϑ2 ∈ Θ2. The top of the square is given by(
D(f) ◦ UΘ1
)
(p)(x)(ϑ2) =
∑
f(ϑ1)=ϑ2
UΘ1(p)(x)(ϑ1)
=
∑
f(ϑ1)=ϑ2 p(ϑ1, x)∑
ϑ′1∈supp(p(−,x)) p(ϑ
′
1, x)
. (?)
The bottom of the square is given by
UΘ2
(
D(f ×X)(p)
)
(x)(ϑ2) =
D(f ×X)(p)(ϑ2, x)∑
ϑ′2
D(f ×X)(p)(ϑ′2, x)
=
∑
f(ϑ1)=ϑ2 p(ϑ1, x)∑
ϑ′2
∑
f(ϑ′1)=ϑ′2
p(ϑ′1, x)
. (??)
The result follows, noting that the denominators of (?) and (??) are equal.
4.3 Bayesian games
In classical game theory, Bayesian games are games in which players have probabilistic
beliefs about the other players in the game.3 We rst state the standard denition, then
discuss what it means.
Definition 4.11 (Bayesian game). A Bayesian game is a tuple (N,A,Θ, p, u) where
1. N = {1, · · · , n} is a finite set of players,
2. A = A1 × · · · ×An where Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i,
3. Θ = Θ1 × · · · ×Θn where Θi is the type space of player i,
4. p : Θ→ [0, 1] is a common prior over types;
5. u = (u1, · · · , un) where ui : A×Θ→ R is the outcome function for player i.
A pure strategy for player i is a function σi : Θi → Ai. A mixed strategy for player i is a function
si : Θi → D(Ai).
The sets N and A are self-explanatory. N species the number of players in the game
and Ai species the set of actions that player i can choose from. Each player i is as-
sociated with a set Θi of types 4. The type space of a player might be something like
3For an introduction see [LBS08, Chapter 7].
4These should not be thought of as types in the usual mathematical sense.
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{good, evil}, {smart, dumb}, or {conservative, risk-taker, chaotic}. The common prior
p : Θ → [0, 1] describes the players’ probabilistic beliefs about which types other players
have been assigned. This information is strategically relevant as players’ outcomes are
allowed to depend on their type and, consequently, which actions are utility-maximising
also depends on players’ types. In a playthrough of a Bayesian game, we imagine that
each player is assigned a type sampled from the common prior; each player observes their
own type and, using this information, updates their belief about the distribution of the
other players’ types; then each player chooses an action in an attempt to maximise their
outcome function.
Example 4.12 (Education game). The education game is a game of two players: an employer e and
an applicant a. The type space of the employer is the one-element set {?}. We suppose that the
applicant is talented with probaility 110 and untalented with probability
9
10 and that their type space
is {t,∼ t} where t and ∼ t correspond to being talented and untalented respectively. The applicant
makes the choice either to attend university or to not attend university, represented by the action set
{u,∼ u}. We suppose that attending university incurs a greater cost if the applicant is untalented.
The employer decides whether to the pay the applicant a high wage or a low wage represented by the
action set {h, l}. The objective of the employer is to offer a high wage only if the applicant is talented5.
We can represent this game as a Bayesian game where
• N = {e, a};
• Ae = {h, l}, Aa = {u,∼ u};
• Θe = {?}, Θa = {t,∼ t};
• p : {?} × {t,∼ t} → [0, 1] is given by
p(?, x) =

1
10 if x = t
9
10 otherwise.
4.4 Epistemics in Bayesian games
In order to dene a sensible solution concept for Bayesian games, we must rst consider
that there exist multiple epistemic states of players in a Bayesian game. The expected
outcome of a choice can change as players learn more about the types in a game. We are
particularly interested in the following epistemic states.
1. ex post - the types of all the players are common knowledge;
5This game assumes that attending university adds no value to the applicant. University only serves as a signal of
the applicant’s talent. This may or may not be accurate.
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2. ex interim - players know only their own type;
3. ex ante - no types are known whatsoever.
Each of these epistemic scenarious has a distinct associated expected outcome function.
Definition 4.13 (Ex post utility). The ex post expected utility of player i in a Bayesian game
(N,A,Θ, p, u) given a mixed strategy profile s = (s1, · · · , sn) and a specification of types ϑ =
(ϑ1, · · · , ϑn) is given by
epi(s, ϑ) =
∑
a∈A
( ∏
j∈N
sj(ϑj)(aj)
)(
ui(a, ϑ)
)
.
Ex interium utility can be dened as a weighted sum of ex post utility functions.
Definition 4.14 (Ex interim utility). The ex interim expected utility of player i with type ϑi ∈ Θi
given a mixed strategy profile s = (s1, · · · , sn) is given by
eii(s, ϑi) =
∑
ϑ−i∈Θ−i
p(ϑ−i|ϑi)epi(s, ϑi, ϑ−i)
Similarly, ex ante utility can be dened as a weighted sum of ex interim utility or,
consequently, of ex post utility
Definition 4.15 (Ex ante utility). The ex ante expected utility of player i given a mixed strategy
profile (s1, · · · , sn) is given by
eai(s) =
∑
ϑ∈Θ
p(ϑ)epi(s, ϑ)
=
∑
ϑi∈Θi
p(ϑi)eii(s, ϑi)
We can then dene Bayesian best response functions that pick out the most protable
unilateral deviations from a mixed strategy prole s. We dene this relative to the ex
ante utility function.
Definition 4.16 (Bayesian best response). Player i’s best responses to the mixed strategy profile s−i
are given by
Bi(s−i) = arg maxs′
i
∈Sieai(s
′
i, s−i)
Bayesian best response then yields a Bayesian solution concept by considering the
strategy proles which are xed points.
Definition 4.17 (Bayesian Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if
∀i ∈ N ,
si ∈ Bi(s−i).
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4.5 Bayesian open games
Definition 4.18 (Bayesian open game). A Bayesian open game is a morphism in GameKl(D). Ex-
plicitly, a Bayesian open game G : (X,S)→ (Y,R) is given by
1. A set of strategies Σ,
2. A play function
P : Σ→
∫ Θ:C (
X → D(Θ× Y ))× ((Θ×R)→ D(S)),
3. A best response function
B : LensKl(D)((I,R), (X,Y ))→ Rel(Σ)
We refer to atoms in the category of Bayesian open games as Bayesian atoms.
We unpack the denition of the play function to emphasize that, when we wish to
actually specify a Bayesian open game, it is usually easier to specify P(σ) as the equivalence
class of a pair of morphisms.
4.6 Bayesian agents
We will now dene Bayesian agents which, as with concrete open games, have constant
best response functions. Bayesian agents capture the notion of rational agents that
1. Have a correct prior about the various types in a game;
2. Update this prior based on an observation;
3. Attempt to maximise their expected utility given their updated prior.
Definition 4.19 (Bayesian agent). Let X,Y be sets. The Bayesian agent A(X,Y ) : (X, I)→ (Y,R) is
the Bayesian atom given by
1. ΣA = X → D(Y ),
2.
Pσ = [σ, !R] = σX Y R
3. The preference function ε : LensKl(D)((I,R), (X,Y ))→ P(X → D(Y )) is given by
εA([p, k]) =
{
σ : X → D(Y )
∣∣∣∣ ∀x ∈ supp(p),
σ(x) ∈ arg max
α∈D(Y )
(
E
[
k(UΘ(p)(x), α)
])}
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Lemma 4.20. The preference function of a Bayesian agent is well-defined. That is, it is indepedent
of the choice of representative of the coend equivalence relation.
Proof. This result follows from the fact that Bayesian updating is natural in the bound type of a coend
lens (4.10).
In the next denition we formalise the idea that a player in a game might be assigned
a (game theoretic) type on which their utility function depends. We can do this simply
using a Bayesian agent and a copying computation.
Definition 4.21. Let A(X,Y ) : (X, I) → (Y,R) be a Bayesian agent. Define A∆(X,Y ) : (X, I) →
(X × Y,R) to be the Bayesian open game
X
A
Y
R
X
.
Lemma 4.22. A∆(X,Y ) is explicitly given, up to isomorphism, by
1. ΣA(X,Y )∆ = X → D(Y );
2. PA∆(X,Y ) : ΣA(X,Y )∆ → LensKl(D)
(
(X, I), (X × Y,R)) is given by
PA∆(X,Y )(σ) = X σ Y
X
R ;
3. Let [p, k] ∈ LensKl(D)
(
(I,R), (X,X × Y )). Best response is given, up to isomorphism by,
BA(X,Y )∆ ([p, k])(σ) = BA(X,Y )([p, k]
′) where [p, k]′ is the context given by
p
X
k
Y
R
.
Proof. This result follows from definition chasing, noting that A(X,Y ) is the only component with
non-trivial strategy profile set.
Lemma 4.23. Let A(Xi,Yi) be Bayesian agents for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. Then A∆
n =
⊗n
i=1A∆(Xi,Yi) is
explicitly given as follows.
1. ΣA∆n =
∏n
i=1(Xi → D(Yi));
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2. The play function
PA∆n : ΣA∆n → LensKl(D)
(( n∏
i=1
Xi, I
)
,
( n∏
i=1
(Xi × Yi),Rn
))
is given by
PAn◦ (σ1, · · · , σn) =
X1
σ1
σn
Xn
Y1
Yn
X1
Xn
...
...
R
R
...
3. Let [p, k] ∈ LensKl(D)
(
(I,Rn), (
∏
iXi,
∏
iXi × Yi)
)
. Best response
BA∆n ([p, k])(σ1, · · · , σn)
is given, up to isomorphism, by
n∏
i=1
{
σi : Xi → D(Yi)
∣∣∣∣ ∀xi ∈ supp(pσ−i),
σi(xi) ∈ arg max
αi∈D(Yi)
(
E
[
kσ−i
(UΘ−i(pσ−i)(xi), αi])}
where [pσ−i , kσ−i ] is the context given by
p
Xi
Xi
Xn
σn
k
Yn
Xn
Yi
Xi
Yi
X1
σ1
Y1
X1 R
R
R
...
...
...
...
...
...
.
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Proof. 1 and 2 follow easily from definitions. As for 3, we need to prove that the local context for
each A(Xi,Yi) is [pσ−i , kσ−i ]. Note that the previous lemma 4.22 serves as the base case (n = 1) for an
induction argument. The result then follows easily by considering that
BA∆n ([p, k])(σ1, · · · , σn) = BA∆(X1,Y1)([p, k]1)(σ1)× B
⊗n
i=2
A∆(Xi,Yi)
([p, k]−1)(σ−1)
and applying the inductive hypothesis, where [p, k]−1 is the context
p X2
Xn
X1
σ1
k
Y1
X1
X2
Y2
Xn
Yn
R
R
R
...
...
...
4.7 Bayesian games as Bayesian open games
Given a Bayesian game G = (N,A,Θ, p, u), we can then model G with the Bayesian open
game⊗ni=1A∆(Θi,Ai) and applying the best response function to the context [p, k] where k isthe outcome function given by
k
(
(ϑ1, a1), · · · , (ϑn, an)
)
= δ(u1(ϑ1,a1),··· ,un(ϑn,an)).
4.8 Decisions under risk
In this section we introduce another type of situation involving a Bayesian agent that can
be modeled using Bayesian open games.
A decision problem under risk is a decision problem for which one can sensibly assign
probabilities to possible outcomes. A good example is roulette. When making a bet in
roulette, you can calculate the likelihood of success and also your expected return on
any bet. Decision problems under risk are generally represented by Bayesian open games
constructed from computations and precisely one Bayesian agent. A simple subclass of
decision problems under risk are represented by Bayesian open games of form
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pA
X
u
R
Y
Z
in which an agent A attempts to maximise their outcome which is, in part, dependent on
the type Z which A does not observe.
We now give a fully worked out example of a Bayesian open game in which an agent has
a prior, makes an observation, updates their prior as a consequence of that observation,
and then makes a prediction based on their updated prior.
Example 4.24 (Biased coins). Suppose we give an agent A a biased coin which lands on one side
75% of the time and the other side 25% of the time. It is not known which side the coin is biased
towards, but it is known that it is equally likely to be biased towards heads as towards tails. A flips
the coin whilst another identical coin (i.e. another coin biased the same way) is flipped in secret. A
observes her coin flip and is then asked to predict which side up the secret coin landed. If she is correct
she receives an outcome of 1 with probability 1. If she is wrong she receives an outcome of 0 with
probability 1. The optimal strategy for A is to guess that the coin flipped in secret will land the same
way up as the coin she flipped. If, for instance, A’s coin comes up heads, then there is a 75% chance
that both coins are biased towards heads. Consequently the coin flipped in secret is more likely to
show heads. A symmetric argument applied if A’s coin shows tails.
We can represent this game using the open game
p
A{H,T}
u
R
{H,T}
{H,T}
where
p : D({H,T}2) = 12
(
9
16(T, T ) +
1
16(H,H) +
3
16(T,H) +
3
16(H,T )
)
+ 12
(
9
16(H,H) +
1
16(T, T ) +
3
16(H,T ) +
3
16(T,H)
)
= 516(H,H) +
5
16(T, T ) +
3
16(T,H) +
3
16(H,T )
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and
u : {H,T}2 → DR
(x, y) 7→
δ1 if x = yδ0 otherwise.
Explicitly, the game is given by G := u◦(A⊗ id{H,T})◦p. Note that ΣG ∼= ΣA = {H,T} → D({H,T}).
Also note that there is precisely one context for G and, moreover, as the best response functions for
u, id{H,T}, and p are total, the best response function for G is isomorphic to the constant relation
BA[p, k] =
{
σ : {H,T} → D({H,T})
∣∣∣∣ ∀x ∈ {H,T},
σ(x) ∈ arg maxα∈D({H,T})E[k(U{H,T}(p)(x), α)]
}
.
The updated prior U{H,T}(p)(H)(H) is given by
U{H,T}(p)(H)(H) = p(H,H)∑
(ϑ,H)∈supp(p) p(ϑ,H)
= 58
and hence U{H,T}(p)(H)(T ) = 38 . Similarly, U{H,T}(p)(T ) = 58T + 38H. It follows that
arg maxα
(
E[k†(U{H,T}(p)(H), α)]
)
= {δH}
arg maxα
(
E[k†(U{H,T}(p)(T ), α)]
)
= {δT }.
Hence BA[p, k] is a singleton set containing the strategy σ where σ(H) = δH and σ(T ) = δT , as
expected.
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